Security

Found something? Report it privately, and thank you — it is genuinely appreciated.

Reporting a vulnerability

Use the feedback form and pick the topic “A security problem”.

That form is a private channel. It does not post anything on the web: submissions go straight into a private inbox that holds nothing but reports, and it is closed — only the maintainer can read it. There is no public repository, no public issue list, and no other place a report could surface before a fix exists. Nothing you write in that form is published anywhere. (The gallery’s form is the one that publishes, after review — do not send a vulnerability there.)

Leave a way to reach you if you want a reply — an email address, or a Discord, LinkedIn or GitHub handle; the form asks which. The field is optional, and without it a report is genuinely anonymous, which also means there is no way to come back to you with questions or to credit you.

A useful report says what you did, what happened, and why it matters. A proof of concept helps enormously. Report it even if you are not sure it is exploitable — deciding that is the maintainer’s job, not yours.

One limitation, stated plainly: the form is protected by HTTPS in transit, but there is no end-to-end encrypted intake and no PGP key. If a finding is severe enough that you want an encrypted channel before describing it, send a short note with no details and ask for one.

What to expect

Safe harbour

Research conducted in good faith under this policy is welcome, and no legal action will be pursued over it. That means: test against your own installation, do not access other people’s data, do not degrade the service for anyone else, and give a reasonable chance to fix before publishing.

Out of scope: volumetric denial of service (flooding a host proves nothing that is not already known), social engineering, physical attacks, spam, and reports generated by a scanner with no analysis behind them. Findings against this website and against the app are both in scope.

In scope, and wanted: a small, well-formed request to the hosted render door that costs a disproportionate amount of work. Routing is superlinear, and an algorithmic-complexity finding there is the risk that matters most. Send the input, not the flood.

What the design already rules out

Worth knowing before you dig, because it removes whole categories of bug from the equation:

None of that makes the project immune, and a finding that contradicts any of the above is exactly the kind of thing worth reporting.

What is inside each release

Every release from 0.110.0 publishes a software bill of materials beside its downloads, so that when a vulnerability is announced in a component you can see for yourself whether a Drawbridge build carries it. There is one for the desktop app, which also covers the web editor it embeds and this site hosts, and one for each self-hosting Docker image. They are CycloneDX JSON — the Electron, Chromium and Node.js the app runs on, every library built into it at its exact version with its registry hash and licence, the connector router at its pinned source commit — and they are generated by the release itself from the same build the release audits, never written by hand.

Each bill is signed with the release key, the same Ed25519 key the desktop app checks before it installs an update of itself. The public half is release-signing-key.pem, and OpenSSL verifies a bill against it with no tool of ours; the command is on the download page, beside the files. The key never leaves the machine that makes releases: not the server that serves the downloads, not the build machines, not the repository.

The bills describe the product. What runs this website — the gateway, the relay, the containers’ base images — is deliberately not published: it is our infrastructure, not your software, and its exact versions are the one place where publication would help an attacker more than a reader. Those versions are kept current under the same rule as everything else here (a security release is a task the day it is seen) and are checked by the release gate; a finding against them is in scope.

security.txt

This policy is advertised in machine-readable form at /.well-known/security.txt, per RFC 9116.